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Latrecchia29 and State v. Davis3" miss completely the ponits of those
holdings, while the discussion o- the 1943 Justice Department circular 3 '
is positively misleading as to both the extent of local defiance of
Barnette32 and the departmentally recommended approach to such
recalcitrants.
In short, this is a book of substantial merit and of substantial flaws.
For the school administrator, the school lawyer, and others primarily
interested in the validity of various specific school practices as against
religious objections, it should serve as an invaluable reference and
guide. It was written with them in mind, and is very successfully done.
By this very fact, it is much less handy for the legal scholar and
political scientist. As a body of raw source material, however, it is of
great worth, making available a wealth of cases and attendant bibliography never before compiled within one volume. For all its defects,
it is a valuable addition to the literature in this field.
David R. Manwaring
Associate Professor of Political Science
Boston College

Tm PPisS. By William A.
CouRT ON FREED OF
Hachten. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1968. Pp. 316.

THE Sup~i~

William A. Hachten, author of this book, is Professor of Journalism
at the University of Wisconsin. The preface indicates that he studied
constitutional law while working on his doctorate at the University of
Minnesota. His stated purpose in writing this book is not primarily to
describe the current state of the law regarding the press, but rather to
explain "the ideas and principles underpinning the freedom of our
system of mass communications as they have been enunciated in decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States."' He attempts to
accomplish this by presenting extensive excerpts from Supreme Court
decisions, concurring and dissenting as well as majority opinions,
interwoven with his own commentary. Professor Hachten admits that
he is biased in favor of the Black-Douglas position on freedom of ex29

BOLES at 150.

Id. at 151.
1Id. at 163.
32319 U.S. 624 (1943).
1W. HAcnTEN.TnE SUEME COURT ON FEEDom
[hereinafter cited as HAcnEN].
20
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pression and warns the reader that the views of these Justices may be
over-represented 2 (which they are).
The basic theme of the book is the move toward greater freedom of
the press, but Professor Hachten finds in the Supreme Court's decisions
implied admonitions that a free press must also be a responsible press.
His ultimate conclusion is that "a press that uses its freedom with
courage, restraint, and responsibility 3need not fear curtailment by the
Supreme Court of the United States."
The contents of the book clearly indicate that Professor Hachten is
not a lawyer writing for the benefit of lawyers, but is, rather, a
journalist with some modest grounding in constitutional law writing for
the benefit of laymen. Still, viewing it from a non-technical standpoint,
the book has deficiencies which make it a less than an authoritative
work on the constitutional underpinnings of freedom of the communications media.
Although the author tells us that he does not attempt to cover
"the whole spectrum of the First Amendment," 4 he seems to equate
the constitutional law of freedom of speech with that of freedom of
the press, relying on Professor Chafee's view that there is no significant
difference between these two freedoms. 5 Accordingly, he deals with
such cases as Dennis v. United States,6 Yates v. United States,7 Barenblatt v. United States, 8 Terminiello v. Chicago,9 and Whitney v. California.'0 His use of these cases is confusing. For example, he devotes
eight pages to excerpts from the Dennis opinions. He then disposes

of Yates in a half page in which he states that the "Supreme Court
found two decisive differences between this and the Dennis case and

set aside the convictions"" and quotes two short paragraphs of Justice
Black's dissenting opinion. The effect of this, of course, is that the
significant change in law worked by Yates is undisclosed. Similarly, the
further erosions of the Dennis doctrine in more recent years are totally
ignored.

There are shortcomings even in those portions of the book which
relate directly to freedom of the media. For example, in a chapter

titled Freedom From Prior Restraint: Censorship, the author dis2 Id. at ix.
3 Id. at 808.

4Id. at 7.
5 Z. Chafee, GovERNm
6841 U.S. 494 (1951).
7854 U.S. 298 (1957).
8860 U.S. 109 (1959).
9887 U.S. 1 (1949).
10 274 U.S. 857 (1927).
11
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cussed, in this order, New v. Minnesota,'5 Roth v. United States,13
Kingsley Books v. Brown,14 Smith v. California,5 Bantam Books v. Sullivan,16 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasurd' v. Massachusetts17 Mishkin v. New York,' 8 Ginzburg v.
United States,' 9 and Mills v. Alabama,2 0 most of which do not involve
any issue of prior restraint. The evolution of the obscenity doctrine
between Roth and the 1966 cases is ignored, except for the fact that
Jacobellis v. Ohio2 ' is discussed nine chapters later under the heading
Freedom of Motion Pictures. In the chapter on motion pictures, the
discussion of Times Film Corporation v. Chicago22 is separated from
the discussion of Freedman v. Maryland23 by three pages in which
Jacobellis is discussed, and the discussion of Freedman is in no way
related to Times Film.
Strangely, despite its obvious relevance to freedom of the press,
the author is seemingly unaware of Valentine v. Chrestensen,24 in
which the Supreme Court held that a prohibition against distribution of
commercial handbills could not be circumvented by incorporating a
political protest in the handbill. This decision, suggesting as it does a
distinction for first amendment purposes between commercial and noncommercial publications, is a potentially pregnant basis for a new line
of development of first amendment law.
In addition, it should be noted that the book includes many rash
oversimplifications which, to a lawyer at least, would cause somewhat
raised eyebrows. The author characterizes the "preferred position" concept of the first amendment as "basically the law today."25 He states
that the "judicial evolution" whereby the fourteenth amendment was
expanded to include the rights of the first amendment "was not
completed until 1925 in the Gitlow case."26 He characterizes the
12283 U.S. 697 (1931).
13354 U.S. 476 (1957). The discussion of Roth ignores the position of
justice Harlan that a different standard may be applicable in the adjudication of
state and federal obscenity cases. Likewise, Chief Justice Warren's position that
the central issue is the conduct of the defendant rather than the obscenity of the
publication is not reflected.
14 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
15 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
16372 U.S. 58 (1963).
17388 U.S. 413 (1966).
18 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
19383 U.S. 463 (1966).
203 84 U.S. 214 (1966).
21378 U.S. 184 (1964).
22365 U.S. 48 (1961).
23380 U.S. 51 (1965).
24816
U.S. 52 (1942).
25
HAcmN 13.

26Id. at 21.
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"Court's current position on Blackstone's prior restraint dictum" as
being "well expressed" in Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Times
Filmy'
Finally, it must be pointed out that the author's more or less indiscriminate excerpting from majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions is confusing, misleading and does not present anything approaching an accurate protrayal of the law. An obvious example of
this is found at page 226 where, under a paragraph headed Any Film
Censorship is Called Unconstitutional,this proposition is supported
solely by the Black-Douglas concurring opinion in Superior Films v.
28
Ohio.
The basic defect of the book is that the author does not "tell it like
it is," but rather as he would like it to be. It is doubtful that lawyers or
law students would find the book to be of any value.
Harold P. Green
Professor of Law
George Washington University
A PuE TrEoRtY oF LAw. By Hans Kelsen. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 356. $7.50.
In normal expression the term law tends to carry a deceptively
familiar meaning; the term jurisprudence a somewhat forbidding connotation of exploration of the philosophical deep. By most standard
measures, the contrast holds. Yet not only does the juridical underlie
the legal order, but riddles its every aspect. A profound simplicity
irradiates from the child's reaction of "why" to a command, a simple
query ever relevant to all aspects of the legal imperative. Consequently
law as a field requires refinement, not so much to glean the dross of
reality as to allow intelligible perception of its supple internal system
of validification. This immensely difficult task, itself an exercise in the
highest orders of jurisprudence, Dr. Hans Kelsen endeavors to undertake in A Pure Theory of Law.'
His work does not pretend to be some metaphysical thunder out
of Sinai, nor any interpretive social scientific prism refracting the legal
order as reactive adjustments to cultural context, nor indeed any kind
of revealed gospel dispensed from profound preconceptions of prin27Id. at 42.
28 346 U.S. 587 (1954).

'H. Kx,.sEN, A Put Tronry ov LAw (1967).

